Richer v. Cornelius

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

REGINA RICHER, Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

FRANK CORNELIUS, Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0074 FC
FILED 01-28-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. S0300DO202000441
The Honorable Ted Stuart Reed, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Rick L. Frimmer, JD CPA, PLLC, Sedona
By Rick L. Frimmer
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Walneck Law, Scottsdale
By Edward J. Walneck
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 The superior court issued a decree (“the Decree”) dissolving
the marriage of Regina Richer (“Wife”) and Frank Cornelius (“Husband”).
Wife appeals from provisions of the Decree denying her request for spousal
maintenance, awarding reimbursement to Husband for his payment of
community expenses with his sole and separate property, and denying her
request for attorney’s fees. Husband cross-appeals, also challenging the
Decree’s reimbursement award. For the following reasons, we affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Husband and Wife married in 2004. Sixteen years later, Wife
petitioned for dissolution of the marriage.

¶3 The parties stipulated to the value of some community assets
and debts but failed to reach agreement on several other issues. The
superior court held a three-day trial on the contested issues and entered the
Decree.

¶4 In the Decree, and specific to this appeal, the superior court:
(1) assigned Husband all community debt, totaling $116,793; (2) denied
Wife’s request for spousal maintenance, finding her eligible for an award
but determining Husband cannot afford such an order; (3) found Husband
owed Wife $18,295 as his one-half share of community expenses paid
separately by Wife after service of the petition and Wife owed Husband
$64,222 as her one-half share of community expenses paid separately by
Husband after service of the petition; (4) awarded Husband reimbursement
of $45,927 for his net payment of community expenses with his sole and
separate property; (5) awarded each spouse $218,110.50 in community
assets; (6) ordered Husband to pay Wife an equalization payment of $68,995
(having subtracted the $45,927 reimbursement award from the amount
Husband otherwise owed to Wife); and (7) denied Wife’s request for
attorney’s fees.

2
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

¶5 Wife timely appealed and Husband timely cross-appealed.
We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution
and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Spousal Maintenance

¶6 Wife challenges the superior court’s denial of her request for
spousal maintenance. She argues no evidence supports the court’s finding
that Husband cannot afford to pay spousal maintenance as requested.

¶7 We review a spousal maintenance award for an abuse of
discretion. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 348, ¶ 14 (App. 1998). In so
doing, we will affirm the superior court’s order if reasonable evidence
supports it. Id.

¶8 At trial, the parties testified at length concerning their
respective financial circumstances. Wife explained she began working for
Husband’s “climbing hold company” in 2000 and “became [a] 50 percent
owner in the company” in 2003. Throughout the marriage, until December
2, 2020, Wife worked for the community business, taking an active role in
its day-to-day operations. According to Wife, the profits from the
community business provided the parties with incomes and “support[ed]
[their] lifestyle.”

¶9 On December 2, 2020, Husband physically assaulted Wife,
inflicting numerous injuries, including a concussion, a torn rotator cuff, and
a broken foot. Wife brought a personal injury claim against Husband, and
the parties reached a settlement agreement requiring Husband to pay Wife
$200,000.

¶10 Before the assault, Wife had no physical, mental, or emotional
limitations impairing her ability to work. After the assault, Wife required
medical treatment, not only for her physical injuries but also for mental
health concerns.

¶11 At the time of trial, Wife earned an annual income of $9,844
from working one day a week at a golf course. Comparing her limited
income to Husband’s reported (affidavit of financial information) annual
income of $117,156, Wife requested spousal maintenance of $2,200 per
month for eight years. She also requested retroactive spousal maintenance
of $2,700 per month from December 2020 until August 2024 (the trial),

3
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

though acknowledging Husband began paying temporary spousal
maintenance of $2,200 per month in April 2022.

¶12 Wife denied having savings or other property to pay for her
reasonable expenses, explaining she had to rely on the settlement monies
and credit before Husband began paying temporary spousal maintenance.
She also testified she lacks the earning capacity to provide for her
reasonable needs, stating she still suffers from physical and mental
challenges that limit her ability to work. Wife recounted applying for
numerous jobs but testified she never received any full-time employment
offers. From her review of his reported income and expenses, Wife opined
Husband could afford to pay her spousal maintenance as requested.

¶13 For his part, Husband testified his monthly expenses ($14,468)
exceed his monthly income ($9,763), requiring him to spend down his
savings each month to cover his bills, though noting his monthly expenses
would decrease to $12,100 if the superior court awarded him the marital
home. Husband testified he pays $542 each month for health insurance but
acknowledged his employer reimburses him for that expense. He also
explained he incurred substantial surgery-related health expenses during
the two years preceding the trial and stated he anticipates having an
additional surgery. Addressing Wife’s request for continuing spousal
maintenance, Husband testified he could not afford to pay Wife as
requested, again pointing to his expenses and explaining he plans to retire
in 2026 at age 65. While denying Wife’s need for support—opining she can
support herself and should have secured full-time employment and
achieved self-sufficiency during the pendency of the dissolution
proceedings—Husband testified he is “willing” to pay Wife spousal
maintenance of $1,000 per month until his retirement date—describing such
an order as “the amount [he] could afford” as “an extra debt.”

¶14 When considering a request for spousal maintenance, the
superior court must first assess the requesting spouse’s eligibility. In re
Marriage of Cotter and Podhorez, 245 Ariz. 82, 85, ¶ 7 (App. 2018); A.R.S.
§ 25-319(A). Only upon a finding of eligibility will the court then determine
“whether to actually grant an award and, if so, the amount and duration.”
Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 85, ¶ 7; A.R.S. § 25-319(B).

¶15 Here, the superior court considered the statutory eligibility
factors and found Wife eligible for spousal maintenance under A.R.S.
§ 25-319(A)(1)—lacking sufficient property to provide for her reasonable
needs—and A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(2)—lacking the earning ability in the labor

4
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

market adequate to be self-sufficient. Husband does not contest these
findings.

¶16 Having found Wife met the threshold eligibility requirement,
the superior court then considered the A.R.S. § 25-319(B) factors. Under that
provision, the court “shall award” spousal maintenance “in an amount and
for a period of time as the court deems just.” A.R.S. § 25-319(B) (2018). In
considering the duration and amount of maintenance, the court must
consider together and weigh all relevant statutory factors. See Rainwater v.
Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 502 (App. 1993) (explaining the superior court
“need not apply every factor,” only those that are applicable on a “case-by-
case” basis); Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 15 (App. 2007) (“The
determination by the court is done on a case-by-case basis and some factors
will not apply.”). In this case, the relevant factors include:

1. The standard of living established during the marriage.

2. The duration of the marriage.

3. The age, employment history, earning ability and physical and
emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance.

4. The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet
that spouse’s needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.

5. The comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their
comparative earning abilities in the labor market.

6. The contribution of the spouse seeking maintenance to the earning
ability of the other spouse.

7. The extent to which the spouse seeking maintenance has reduced
that spouse’s income or career opportunities for the benefit of the
other spouse.

....

9. The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
marital property apportioned to that spouse, and that spouse’s
ability to meet that spouse’s own needs independently.

10. The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate

5
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

employment and whether such education or training is readily
available.

11. Excessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment or
fraudulent disposition of community, joint tenancy and other
property held in common.

12. The cost for the spouse who is seeking maintenance to obtain health
insurance and the reduction in the cost of health insurance for the
spouse from whom maintenance is sought if the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought is able to convert family health insurance to
employee health insurance after the marriage is dissolved.

13. All actual damages and judgments from conduct that resulted in
criminal conviction of either spouse in which the other spouse
. . . was the victim.

A.R.S. § 25-319(B).

¶17 Applying these factors to this case, the superior court found:
(1) “the parties lived beyond their means during their marriage,” noting
divorce often compels both parties to adopt a lesser standard of living; (2)
the parties’ marriage was of “medium duration”; (3) Wife (age 50) worked
for the community business during the marriage but has not worked full-
time since Husband assaulted her in December 2020; (4) Wife, having
“resumed physically demanding activities such as mountain and road
biking,” is physically and mentally capable of “working to support herself”;
(5) Husband (age 63) intends to retire in June 2026 and has reasonable
monthly expenses and minimum debt service payments exceeding his
monthly gross income (not including his voluntary retirement
contributions, Husband’s expenses exceed his income by $1,323.64 each
month); (6) Husband has “comparatively much greater financial resources
than Wife, including their comparative earning abilities in the labor
market”; (7) “Wife possesses numerous marketable skills” but has “very
limited recent experience working outside of the community business”; (8)
Wife did not contribute to Husband’s earning ability; (9) Wife has not
reduced her income or career opportunities to benefit Husband; (10) to
“partially balance” the “disproportionality” between the parties’ economic
positions, Husband must “pay all community debts”; (11) “Wife must work
to provide for her financial needs”; (12) Wife has applied for a business
degree program and believes her schooling will “require four to eight years
to complete”; (13) neither party presented competent evidence of
concealment, fraudulent disposition, destruction, or waste of community

6
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

property; (14) Wife receives medical insurance coverage through the
Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System; and (15) Husband
physically assaulted Wife and paid her $200,000 as part of a settlement
agreement, but neither party submitted evidence of actual damages and
judgments arising out of the assault. While noting that Husband’s payment
of $2,200 per month in temporary spousal maintenance from April 2022
through August 2024 (29 months) “was appropriate and necessary” to
support Wife in a transition to self-sufficiency, the court further found that
“Husband does not have the financial resources to continue providing Wife
any further spousal maintenance.”

¶18 First, Wife contests the superior court’s finding that
Husband’s monthly expenses and debt service payments exceed his
income. She argues Husband vastly overstated his monthly expenses,
double-counted some of them, and improperly included non-recurring
expenses and voluntary payments in his calculation.

¶19 “The general law in Arizona is that a party must timely
present her legal theories to the trial court so as to give it an opportunity to
rule properly.” Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 495, ¶ 11 (App. 2014)
(citation modified). “An appellant also has an obligation to provide
transcripts and other documents necessary to consider the issues raised on
appeal,” and we presume missing transcripts support a superior court’s
ruling. Id.

¶20 Apart from his testimony, Husband outlined his monthly
expenses in his affidavit of financial information and in a spreadsheet, both
admitted as exhibits at trial. Although Wife objected to the admission of the
spreadsheet on grounds it failed to adequately delineate between
community and separate expenses Husband paid since the filing of the
petition, she did not otherwise contest its admissibility or accuracy.

¶21 On appeal, Wife has provided only partial transcripts of the
trial, none of which reflect any of the challenges she now raises to
Husband’s claimed monthly expenses. In fact, the appellate record does not
reflect that Wife questioned the validity of any of Husband’s claimed
expenses at trial. In the absence of full trial transcripts, we presume Wife
failed to raise these arguments in the superior court and therefore has
waived them on appeal. See Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 350, ¶ 28 (applying
waiver on appeal based on party’s failure to challenge claimed monthly
expense, documented in two exhibits admitted at trial, in the superior
court).

7
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

¶22 Second, Wife argues Husband conceded his ability to pay
spousal maintenance at trial. To support this contention, Wife cites the
following exchange:

[Counsel]: Sir, it’s your position that you’re, you’re willing
to—if the Court finds that she qualifies for spousal
maintenance, that [Wife] should receive spousal maintenance
until you turn 65 and you retire, correct?

[Husband]: Yes.

[Counsel]: And combined total from the date she first
received spousal maintenance to that date, that would be 51
months of spousal maintenance, correct?

[Husband]: Yes.

[Counsel]: Would you be then asking that this Court set as of
its order that the spousal maintenance amount be at $1,000
dollars a month?

[Husband]: Yes.

[Counsel]: Do you believe that’s fair?

[Husband]: I believe that’s more than fair.

[Objection and discussion, prompting court to overrule the
objection.]

[Counsel]: You can answer questions. Do you believe that’s
fair?

[Husband]: Yes.

[Counsel]: And why do you think that’s, that’s fair, even
though you can’t afford it?

[Objection and discussion, prompting court to overrule the
objection.]

....

[Counsel]: Why do you think that’s fair even though you can’t
afford it?

8
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

[Husband]: I don’t—obviously, I don’t think it’s fair or right,
but it’s what the Arizona law states.

[Counsel]: Well, okay, so let’s back up here. The law states
that, well, let’s be careful here. Part of the factors here is it
takes into, they look at how much you can pay. And your
testimony was that you are, you do not have that amount of
money on a monthly basis with your costs. And I’m trying to
figure out, why are you offering and saying, well, fine, if we’re
going to go ahead and she qualifies, I’m willing to say that $1,000 a
month for until I retire is reasonable. Why would you say that?

[Husband]: Because that’s probably the amount that I could
afford.

[Counsel]: Okay. And begrudgingly too, it would be an extra
debt, correct?

[Husband]: Yes.

(Emphasis in original).

¶23 Read within the context of his broader trial testimony—
detailing the extent to which his monthly expenses exceed his monthly
income—Husband did not admit he could afford to pay Wife spousal
maintenance of $1,000 per month by testifying he was willing to do so.
Instead, he testified that if the superior court found Wife eligible for spousal
maintenance, he could pay her $1,000 per month until he retires—despite
his inability to afford it—by carrying the obligation as “an extra debt.” In
other words, Husband testified he could pay court-ordered spousal
maintenance by further spending down his savings until retirement, but at
that point, such an obligation would be infeasible.

¶24 Consistent with A.R.S. § 25-319(B), the superior court
considered, among other things, the financial resources of both parties and
the ability of the paying spouse to meet his own needs. The court made
specific findings concerning all relevant statutory factors, and record
evidence supports each of those findings. On review, we do not assess the
credibility of witnesses, reweigh conflicting evidence, redetermine the
preponderance of the evidence, or substitute our judgment in place of the
superior court’s discretion. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App. 2009);
see also Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 346, ¶ 27 (App. 2020). On this
record, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wife’s
request for spousal maintenance.

9
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

II. Reimbursement Award

¶25 Both parties challenge the superior court’s reimbursement
award to Husband for the net community expenses he separately paid
following Wife’s filing of the dissolution petition. According to Wife, the
court erroneously included in its reimbursement calculation community
expenses Husband separately paid in June and July 2024, despite the
parties’ stipulation (and a confirming court order) imposing a May 21, 2024
disclosure deadline for any reimbursement claims. Adopting Husband’s
accounting of his separate payment of community expenses through the
disclosure deadline, Wife contends he is entitled to reimbursement of only
$122,908, not $128,444 as found by the court, a difference of $5,536 that
reduced the equalization amount payable to Wife by the same. On
cross-appeal, Husband argues the court misapplied the law by imposing an
“arbitrary” limitation on reimbursement claims rather than considering all
community expenses—separately paid by both parties—from the date Wife
filed the petition until the date of dissolution.

¶26 The superior court has “broad discretion in determining what
allocation of property and debt is equitable under the circumstances,” and
we will not disturb this determination “absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
In re Marriage of Inboden, 223 Ariz. 542, 544, ¶ 7 (App. 2010); In re Marriage of
Flower, 223 Ariz. 531, 535, ¶ 14 (App. 2010). We also review a superior
court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion and
will not reverse unless the court made a legal error resulting in unfair
prejudice. Coleman v. Amon, 252 Ariz. 107, 110, ¶ 5 (App. 2021). A court
“may abuse its discretion if it commits an error of law in the process of
exercising its discretion.” Boncoskey v. Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. 448, 451, ¶ 13
(App. 2007) (citation modified).

¶27 Under A.R.S. § 25-211(A)(2), “the marital community is
deemed to have terminated upon the service of a petition that results in a
decree of dissolution.” Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 596, ¶ 15 (App.
2017). Accordingly, the superior court must account for post-petition
payments of community expenses made from separate property in
equitably dividing community property. Id. at ¶ 19. In other words, a party
who services community debt or maintains community assets with his
separate property after termination of the marital community is entitled to
reimbursement for those expenditures. Id.

¶28 Relying on Bobrow, both Husband and Wife asserted claims
for reimbursement of community expenses. Before trial, the parties

10
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

stipulated to a “final Bobrow disclosure deadline” of May 21, 2024, and the
superior court entered an order confirming the same.

¶29 At trial, Wife presented an exhibit outlining various
community bills she separately paid from December 2020 through May
2024. She testified she incurred Bobrow expenses of $37,504.67 and
requested that Husband reimburse her $18,253 for his one-half share of
those community expenses.

¶30 Husband, in turn, testified that he also paid community
expenses with his sole and separate property after Wife filed for
dissolution. He presented exhibits detailing his payment of community
expenses from December 2020 through July 2024. Wife’s attorney objected,
arguing the superior court should not consider any community expenses
paid after the disclosure deadline because Wife, having abided by the
court’s order, did not have the opportunity to introduce her expenses “for
the same timeframe.” Noting the trial had been continued twice, Husband’s
attorney countered that Husband was “simply [] trying to provide the
Court the most up-to-date information regarding those Bobrow expenses.”
The superior court stated it would not consider any Bobrow expenses
incurred after the May 2024 disclosure deadline.

¶31 Consistent with its statement at trial, the superior court
confirmed in the Decree that “the Bobrow calculation period” ended in May
2024. Nonetheless, the court adopted Husband’s reimbursement
calculation, which, the parties agree, included community expenses
Husband separately paid in June and July 2024.

¶32 Under Bobrow, a party is entitled to reimbursement for all
community expenses paid with sole and separate property after the service
of the petition until the date of dissolution. 241 Ariz. at 596, ¶ 19. Indeed,
“[w]hen such payments are made, they must be accounted for in an
equitable property distribution.” Id. (emphasis added).

¶33 Here, neither party disputes that the other party paid
community expenses with separate property after the discovery deadline.
The record reflects that the superior court considered, apparently
unwittingly, Husband’s June and July 2024 expenditures on behalf of the
community without allowing Wife to present evidence of the same, leading
to an inequitable reimbursement award. Because the Decree’s
reimbursement calculation fails to account for all community expenses
separately paid by both Husband and Wife from the disclosure deadline
until the date of dissolution, we vacate the Decree’s Bobrow reimbursement

11
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

provision (and related equalization payment provision) and remand to the
superior court so both parties may present evidence of all community
expenses separately paid by either party during the relevant period.

III. Attorney’s Fees

¶34 Wife appeals the superior court’s denial of her request for
attorney’s fees. She challenges the Decree’s omission of any findings of fact
to explain the basis for the ruling and, consistent with her argument below,
contends the financial disparity between the parties justifies an award of
attorney’s fees in her favor.

¶35 Section 25-324 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees after
considering both parties’ financial resources and the reasonableness of their
positions throughout the proceedings. While a court must consider both the
parties’ resources and positions, it may grant or deny an attorney’s fees
request based upon either factor alone. See Magee v. Magee, 206 Ariz. 589,
591, ¶ 8 n.1 (App. 2004). Moreover, A.R.S. § 25-324 is permissive, granting
the court discretion “to deny a fee request even after considering both
statutory factors,” so a financial disparity “does not mandate an award of
fees.” Myrick, 235 Ariz. at 494, ¶ 9.

¶36 At trial, both parties requested an award of attorney’s fees.
Wife testified she has no ability to pay her fees and asserted Husband
“delayed this trial for several years” and refused all her settlement offers to
end the litigation. Pointing to his own attorney’s fees of “nearly $100,000,”
Husband claimed that Wife and her attorneys took unreasonable positions
and unnecessarily prolonged the litigation, “cost[ing him] extra money.”

¶37 In the Decree, the superior court referenced the relevant
considerations under A.R.S. § 25-324 and then summarily denied both
parties’ requests for attorney’s fees: “Having considered the financial
resources of each party, as well as the reasonableness and unreasonableness
of their respective positions throughout this litigation, IT IS ORDERED that
each party shall bear their own attorney fees and costs.”

¶38 We review a superior court’s ruling on an attorney’s fees
request under A.R.S. § 25-324 for an abuse of discretion. Myrick, 235 Ariz.
at 494, ¶ 6. While we generally will uphold such a ruling “if there is any
reasonable basis for it,” In re Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403, 410, ¶ 20 (App.
2011) (citation modified), when a party requests specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law before trial, see Ariz. R. Fam. L. 82(a)(1), “[i]t must be
clear . . . how the court actually did arrive at its conclusions.” Kelsey v.
Kelsey, 186 Ariz. 49, 51 (App. 1996) (citation modified) (explaining that

12
 RICHER v. CORNELIUS
Decision of the Court

when a party has requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, a
reviewing court “may not affirm simply because [it] may find some possible
basis for [a ruling] in the record”).

¶39 In this case, Wife invoked ARFLP 82(a) before trial.
Accordingly, the superior court had a duty to set forth the specific factual
findings underpinning its denial of her request for attorney’s fees. Because
the court failed to make the requisite specific findings, we vacate the
provision of the Decree denying Wife’s request for attorney’s fees and
remand for the superior court to enter specific findings of fact.

CONCLUSION

¶40 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the reimbursement
awards and equalization payment provisions of the Decree. We remand so
the superior court may consider evidence of both parties’ reimbursement
claims accruing between the May 2024 disclosure deadline and the date of
dissolution and recalculate the reimbursement award for each party,
including any resulting equalization payment owed to one party or the
other.

¶41 We also vacate the provision of the Decree denying Wife’s
request for attorney’s fees and remand so the court may enter specific
factual findings under A.R.S. § 25-324 to explain its decision. We affirm the
Decree in all other respects.

¶42 Both Husband and Wife request attorney’s fees on appeal
under A.R.S. § 25-324. Neither party has taken an unreasonable position on
appeal and we have no current information concerning the parties’
financial resources. Accordingly, in the exercise of our discretion, we
decline to award attorney’s fees or costs to either party.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

13